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1. Introduction
To a significant extent, researchers have studied in-
terfirm relationships (IFRs) through factors within the 
relationship itself. For example, a large share of  IFR re-
search addresses the patterns of  interactions between 
the partners in terms of  psychosocial states, or in terms 
of  how the partners behave and respond to each other, 
i.e., behavioral processes (e.g., Morgan and Hunt, 
1994 and Ganesan, 1994). In addition, IFR research in-
cludes investigations of  the structure or governance of  
the relationship (e.g., Heide, 1994). Thus, whether fo-
cused on behavioral processes or relationship structure, 
investigators have tended to emphasize the situation as 
it exists and develops within the IFR. While extremely 
fruitful, a focused study of  the relationship situation po-
tentially atomizes the IFR from other proximate and im-
portant influences. One important factor that would en-
rich our understanding of  IFRs is the influence of  firm 
predispositions on IFR formation and management.
Predispositions refer to characteristics or “traits” that 
the firm exhibits at the collective level. These pre-exist-
ing “traits” influence how the firm conducts itself  and 
behaves in a variety of  arenas. As such, we suggest a 
firm’s predispositions greatly influence its interactions 
with IFR partners and its behavior in making and man-
aging IFRs. For example, some firms are more strate-
gically aggressive and ambitious than others. Likewise, 
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some firms are generally more prone to make certain 
types of  IFRs (e.g., close partner-style relationships) 
than others (cf., Frazier, 1999). Together and in com-
bination, predispositions, firm level characteristics or 
behavioral “traits,” affect the firm’s IFRs in important 
ways.
In this study, we attempt to isolate important firm 
level predispositions and evaluate their influence on the 
firm’s making and management of  IFRs. The predispo-
sitions we investigate include the firm’s strategic aggres-
siveness in terms of  Hamel and Prahalad’s (1989) stra-
tegic intent and the firm’s general proclivity to trust and 
engage in close IFRs, which we refer to as relational 
proclivity. We expect these predispositions to intensify 
the firm’s boundary spanning activities with other firms. 
Further, we expect that when they combine, the predis-
positions will result in an even greater intensification of  
boundary spanning activities than they do individually. 
In addition, the intensified boundary spanning activities, 
which we describe in terms of  the degree of  connected-
ness in the firm’s interface with other firms, should re-
sult in more effectiveness in individual IFRs. We con-
ceptualize IFR effectiveness as the presence of  the norm 
of  reciprocity, the quality of  information exchange, and 
the degree of  cooperative behavior between the firms.
In the sections hereafter, we discuss the theoretical 
background and framework. We define and develop 
the specific pre-dispositional factors we have isolated as 
important influences on IFR making and management. 
Following this, we offer hypotheses concerning how the 
predispositions influence the extent of  connectedness 
in IFR boundary spanning and the subsequent implica-
tions of  that influence in terms of  IFR effectiveness. In 
the next sections, we describe the empirical study that 
tests the hypothesized relationships and report the re-
sults. The final sections of  the paper include a discus-
sion of  the findings and implications.
2. Theoretical framework
At a broad abstract level, the political economies 
framework depicts IFRs in terms of  two major fac-
tors, the external and the internal political economy 
(Stern and Reve, 1980). The external political econ-
omy involves the effects of  environmental factors 
on IFRs. A perusal of  the literature suggests that re-
searchers have provided significant understanding of  
how environmental factors such as turbulence and 
technology influence the IFR (e.g., Heide and John, 
1990 and Noordewier et al., 1990). Seemingly more 
complex, the internal political economy is comprised 
of  a variety of  structural and process phenomena such 
as power, influence, trust, commitment, dependence, 
governance structures, and decision-making structures, 
for example. Together the factors making up the inter-
nal polity and economy of  the IFR can be thought of  
as describing and explaining the situation within the re-
lationship. Thus far, extant literature has developed a 
rich picture of  the situation within the IFR in terms of  
partner interactions and responses in the IFR, conflict, 
commitment, trust, etc. (e.g., Morgan and Hunt, 1994). 
In addition, we have learned much about the situation 
within the IFR in terms of  structural factors such as de-
pendence and governance (e.g., Heide, 1994).
Even a cursory review shows that examinations of  
the IFR situation and environmental influences has 
yielded substantial understanding of  IFRs (e.g., Dwyer 
and Tanner, 1999). However, we suggest that this pic-
ture may not be complete. Several authors have implic-
itly and explicitly noted a tendency in research to atom-
ize the IFR from important influences (e.g., Anderson 
et al., 1994 and Ritter, 1999). Here we suggest that one 
important influence not sufficiently considered in litera-
ture is firm level “traits” or behavioral tendencies of  the 
IFR partners, that is, their predispositions.
All relationship participants have some predisposi-
tions or “baggage” that they bring to the relationship 
and that influence the way they behave and conduct 
their interactions with others. Our central premise is 
that this is also true for interfirm relationships. Char-
acteristics or behavioral “traits” of  the firm that exist 
apart from the relationship greatly influence how the 
firm behaves and interacts in IFRs. That is, the develop-
ment and management of  an IFR depends on the situa-
tion within the IFR, however, it also depends to a great 
extent on firm level characteristics or predispositions. 
To more fully understand and effectively manage IFRs, 
we need to enlarge our perspective to include firm level 
predispositions.
To understand these predispositions, it is useful to 
juxtapose them with individual predispositions. We 
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caution that firm and individual predispositions are dis-
tinct. Obviously, as we explain below, firm level predis-
positions derive from phenomena at the collective level. 
However, descriptions of  individual level predispositions 
are useful as an analogue.
It is easy to understand that at the individual level, 
our predispositions, our tendency to trust or our pro-
clivity for intimacy, for example, affect how we make 
and manage our personal relationships (e.g., Goto, 
1996). As with individuals, at the firm level, predis-
positions are not explicitly observable characteristics 
(Weiss and Adler, 1984). They are unobservable states 
or “traits” in the firm’s cognitive system. Predisposi-
tions are inferred over time and imputed through in-
formed observation and reporting (Weiss and Adler, 
1984). Thus, firm predispositions do not include factors 
such as size, nor do they include contextual concepts 
such as firm reputation. Predispositions are stable be-
havioral tendencies that result in certain consistencies 
in the firm’s actions across an array of  circumstances 
(Staw et al., 1986). Predispositions mean that the firm 
displays or exhibits the stamp of  some inherent behav-
ioral “traits” across various situations, or in our case, in 
the IFRs in which it participates Pervin, 1989 and Sit-
kin and Weingart, 1995. Although, firm predispositions 
are relatively stable, persistent, and enduring, they also 
simultaneously accumulate and evolve over time (Sit-
kin and Weingart, 1995). In a sense, firm predisposi-
tions are dynamically enduring. This is due to learning 
and adaptation by firms.
Though not explicitly addressed as predispositions, 
the notion of  firm level characteristics affecting market-
ing activities has occasionally appeared in the literature. 
For example, firm innovativeness and firm technological 
orientation have been investigated as an influencing in 
new product introduction (e.g., Gatignon and Xuereb, 
1997), and surgency, i.e., strategic aggressiveness of  the 
firm has been cast as a factor in competitive signaling 
(e.g., Clark and Montgomery, 1998). Interestingly, one 
study investigated firm technological innovativeness as 
an influence on how the firm assembled and managed 
its portfolio of  IFRs (Dutta and Weiss, 1997). However, 
this study did not investigate how a firm’s technological 
innovativeness influenced its activities, behaviors, and 
management practices within the IFR. To our knowl-
edge this paper is among the first to explicitly consider 
that these disparate firm level behavioral tendencies oc-
casionally seen in the literature, taken together actually 
crystallize into a systematic and substantive set of  influ-
ences on the firm’s marketing activities.
2.1. The role of  firm predispositions on IFRs
As noted, some researchers have studied variables 
that are essentially firm level predispositions. However, 
to our knowledge, marketing scholars have not overtly 
nor explicitly considered firm level predispositions as in-
fluences on IFR making and management. To test our 
central premise that firm predispositions influence IFR 
management, we isolated two that we expect to influ-
ence firm behavior in IFRs, strategic aggressiveness and 
relational proclivity.
Given the growing concern for strategic perspec-
tives on IFR making and management, strategic ag-
gressiveness merits investigation as a pre-dispositional 
influence on IFRs. An increasing number of  scholars 
have suggested IFRs as a means to gain strategic ad-
vantage (e.g., Achrol, 1991, Dyer and Singh, 1998, Jap, 
1999 and Johnson, 1999). If, as these authors suggest, 
IFRs play important strategic roles in the firm, the firm’s 
predisposition with regard to strategic aggressiveness is a 
logical starting point for understanding pre-dispositional 
influences. Likewise, the notion of  relationalism and the 
merits of  close partner-style relationships in IFRs contin-
ues to gain momentum in the literature (e.g., Geyskens 
et al., 1996, Geyskens et al., 1998 and Jap and Gane-
san, 2000). Some authors have suggested that the appli-
cations of  relationalism may have been overextended 
and it may not be appropriate in all cases (Frazier, 1999). 
This suggests that the firm’s proclivity toward these types 
of  close partner-style relationships warrants investiga-
tion as a pre-dispositonal factor. Below we review and 
discuss the two predispositions that we expect to influ-
ence IFRs.
2.1.1. Strategic intent
We view the extent of  the firm’s strategic aggressive-
ness in terms of  strategic intent (Hamel and Prahalad, 
1989). As defined by Hamel and Prahalad (1989), stra-
tegic intent involves the extent to which firms are ori-
ented toward winning competitively. It suggests that 
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the firm works constantly and energetically toward 
growth and market dominance in all possible ways. 
Strategic intent gages the firm’s strategic aggressive-
ness and ambition. It suggests that firms will delib-
erately and explicitly muster all possible resources in 
pursuit of  their objectives. The stronger the firm’s stra-
tegic intent, the more avenues it will find and use to 
gain competitive advantage. Strategic intent implies 
that the firm will view all resources through the lens 
of  strategic ambition. Wherever possible, resources are 
garnered and considered as strategic assets to be de-
ployed as effectively as possible in achieving compet-
itive advantage.
2.1.2. Relational proclivity
Relational proclivity refers to the strength of  the gen-
eral tendency held by a firm to seek out, engage in, 
and make close partner-style IFRs as opposed to con-
ducting interfirm interaction at arm’s-length. Despite 
the potential benefits that closer partner-style relation-
ships apparently bring, some firms seem unwilling to 
build such relationships, preferring to keep transactions 
at arm’s-length. This suggests that though for different 
reasons, firms, like individuals, vary in their procliv-
ity for close relationships (cf., Larson, 1992 and Rot-
ter, 1967). Relational proclivity exists independent of  
any specific partner or any prior information specific to 
any potential partner. It could be rooted in a number of  
factors, although the tendency toward trusting would 
likely play a substantial role (Rotter, 1967). Strong pro-
clivity, for example, can stem from beliefs that partner-
ing will enhance outcomes, or general preferences for 
joint projects. Strong proclivity indicates that a phi-
losophy of  partnership exists. Weaker relational pro-
clivity, where firms tend to avoid close and deep as-
sociation with IFR partners, can be rooted in fears of  
exploitation, being cheated, or other forms of  oppor-
tunism, or simply a lack of  comfort with sharing deci-
sion-making domains.
2.2. Model development and hypotheses
We expect that the firm predispositions of  strategic 
intent and relational proclivity will influence the IFR 
directly through boundary spanning structures and ac-
tivities. In interfirm research, the characteristics of  
boundary spanning activities between firms have been 
described in several ways. For example, Mohr and col-
leagues (e.g., Mohr et al., 1996) have examined com-
munication patterns. Dwyer and colleagues (e.g., Dw-
yer and Oh, 1987) have evaluated boundary spanning in 
terms of  decision structure characteristics such as for-
malization or centralization. Here, we depart slightly 
from these perspectives and conceptualize the firm’s ap-
proach to boundary spanning in general through the no-
tion of  connectedness. Fig. 1 depicts the effects of  the 
predispositions on connectedness. In addition, the fig-
ure shows the mediated effects of  the predispositions 
on relationship outcomes, which we discuss in the fol-
lowing sections.
2.2.1. Connectedness
In the marketing literature, researchers have applied 
the concept of  connectedness in several contexts. From a 
network analysis viewpoint, theorists (e.g., Anderson et 
al., 1994, Ritter, 1999 and Ritter, 2000; also see Gemün-
den et al., 1996) draw on the idea that the performance 
and effectiveness of  one IFR are influenced by other 
IFRs which the participants in the initial relationship 
may have. From this perspective, theory development 
pivots on this idea of  connectedness or more specifi-
cally the interconnectedness between the firm’s various 
IFRs. In contrast, from an intrafirm perspective, con-
nectedness has been used to describe the relationship be-
tween functional areas within the firm. For example, R 
and D and marketing departments can vary in their con-
nectedness, the strength of  their relationship and extent 
to which they communicate and coordinate. Connect-
edness has been used to investigate antecedents of  the 
marketing concept (Jaworski and Kohli, 1993) and in in-
ter-functional research Maltz and Kohli, 1996 and Song 
and Parry, 1993.
Clearly, the notion of  connectedness is useful at net-
work and within firm levels of  analysis. We suggest that 
it is also useful to consider connectedness in terms of  
the firm’s boundary spanning. Similar to connectedness 
between the functional areas in a firm, IFRs themselves 
can vary according to the strength or extent of  connect-
edness between the participating firms.
F i r m  p r e d i s p o s i t i o n s  a n d  i n t e r F i r m  r e l at i o n s h i p  F o r m at i o n  i n  b u s i n e s s  m a r k e t s   303
Frequent interaction among multiple boundary span-
ners and across multiple managerial levels characterizes 
high levels of  connectedness between firms in an IFR; 
however, it involves much more. High levels of  con-
nectedness can be visualized as thick interfirm bound-
ary spanning structures with strong healthy communi-
cation patterns. Importantly, along with frequent and 
intense communication, connectedness entails high 
quality and open communication. It suggests easy, ready, 
and substantive communication in boundary spanning 
between firms. It also includes the extent to which the 
interface between IFRs spans multiple levels of  man-
agement. High levels of  connectedness means extensive, 
high quality communication via multiple means between 
multiple managers at multiple points and multiple levels of  the 
firm’s managerial hierarchy. At the other end of  the spec-
trum, thin boundary spanning structures are those where 
interfirm interaction is limited to few individuals, is rel-
atively infrequent, and rarely crosses managerial levels 
in the firms. Thin boundary spanning structures signify 
low levels of  connectedness where communication pat-
terns are weak and often confined to fewer or even a sin-
gle level of  managers in the firms.
2.2.2. The effects of  firm predispositions on connectedness
We expect the firm’s strategic ambition in terms of  its 
strategic intent to influence the extent of  connectedness 
in its IFRs. When a firm has strong strategic intent, it 
searches out and musters all possible resources that can 
be used in achieving strategic objectives and sustainable 
competitive advantage. Further, the firm then focuses 
those resources on its objectives and the attainment of  
competitive advantage (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989). 
Thus, firms with strong strategic intent are more likely 
to be enlightened with regard to the potential role of  
IFRs as a resource to be developed and used in achiev-
ing their objectives (Dyer and Singh, 1998). While stra-
tegic intent does not guarantee that the firm will au-
tomatically see IFRs as a viable avenue for achieving 
strategic objectives, recent research suggests that firms 
do see their IFRs as assets to be strategically leveraged 
Jap, 1999 and Johnson, 1999.
The strategically aggressive firm’s view of  the IFR as 
an asset or resource to be used in achieving competitive 
advantage plays out in several ways for the interaction 
between IFR partners. First, the IFR offers a potentially 
Fig. 1. Effects of  firm predispositions on interfirm relationships. Dotted line indicates non-hypothesized direct effects.
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expanded base of  resources and capabilities for the firm 
(Dyer and Singh, 1998). However, to access a partner’s 
resource base, thereby realizing a potential expansion 
in resources, the firm must develop the right type of  in-
terface with the partner. The possibility of  tapping into 
an expanded resource base motivates the strategically 
aggressive firm to connect strongly with its partners in 
boundary spanning activities.
In addition to the possibility of  tapping into an ex-
panded resource base, the strategically ambitious firm 
should show greater levels of  connectedness in the in-
terface with its IFR partners to develop inimitability in 
its IFRs. Arm’s-length relationships may be efficient 
and effective in some respects. But they do not offer the 
same potential for sustainable competitive advantage 
that close partner-style IFRs do, as they can be more 
readily duplicated and thus lose their ability to generate 
competitive advantage Dyer and Singh, 1998 and Jap, 
1999. To create and preserve the inimitability in IFRs 
that makes them valuable competitively (Ford and Mc-
Dowell, 1999), firms must make the effort and invest-
ment in boundary spanning activities (Jap, 1999). The 
firm will work to develop and cultivate its IFRs. A ma-
jor means is likely through thicker boundary spanning, 
i.e., greater connectedness with IFR partners. Thus, we 
posit the following:
H1. The stronger the firm’s strategic intent, the 
greater the level of  connectedness with its IFR 
partners.
Strong relational proclivity suggests that firms are 
positively inclined toward IFRs. Such firms are more 
open to trusting partners (cf., Rotter, 1967) and build-
ing IFRs in general (Larson, 1992). Relational procliv-
ity means that IFRs are viewed as beneficial and ad-
vantageous. It suggests that firms have little problem 
with sharing tasks, decision-making, and projects with 
IFR partners (Larson, 1992). In addition to other ad-
vantages, the firm often sees gains in prestige from as-
sociation with certain firms in IFRs Anderson et al., 
1994 and Larson, 1991. Relational proclivity means that 
though risks may be present, the firm assumes the risk. 
The firm sees partnering of  a certain nature as a desir-
able alternative to other forms.
These relationally predisposed firms will be more 
inclined to commit managerial resources in terms of  
time and effort to IFRs. With relational proclivity, IFRs 
that begin with a central or primary exchange may of-
ten enlarge into diverse aspects, with an array of  ad-
vantages and benefits (Larson, 1992). This process is 
aided by frequent and extensive managerial interaction 
with IFR partners at multiple levels in the firm, that is, 
high levels of  connectedness. As interdependence ex-
pands (Geyskens et al., 1996) and the IFR develops into 
a “package,” the partner firms become tightly integrated 
through extensive communication and thick boundary 
spanning Larson, 1991 and Larson, 1992. Because firms 
that have strong relational proclivity are prone toward 
enlarged and interdependent IFRs, and thick boundary 
spanning is often seen as aiding this enlargement pro-
cess, we propose the following:
H2. The greater the firm’s relational proclivity, 
the greater the level of  connectedness in its IFRs.
We expect the pre-dispositional factors of  strate-
gic intent and relational proclivity individually will re-
sult in stronger connectedness between IFR partners. 
Moreover, we expect these predispositions to have a 
combined interactive effect on the level of  connected-
ness between firms in IFRs. When firms actively seek 
competitive dominance and view IFRs as a vehicle by 
which this is accomplished, either because of  access to 
potentially expanded resource bases or because of  their 
inimitability, and when this strategic aggressiveness 
couples with a preference for IFRs that are “enlarged” 
with expanded interdependence, the firm should show 
an even greater willingness to commit investments and 
effort in boundary spanning to build IFRs. We note 
that the joint effects of  the pre-dispositional factors on 
connectedness in the IFR involves an interaction be-
tween the predispositions. Importantly, however, we 
expect interaction effects to be positive only.1 That is, 
1. Essentially, we are positing an ordinal interaction, where the slopes of  the regression lines involved differ significantly, 
but the two lines do not cross in empirical reality (Pedhazur, 1982, p. 353). This is from the conceptual perspective only. 
Of  course, the fact that non-parallel lines will eventually intersect is an indisputable mathematical property. The important 
distinction here is that they will not do so in empirical reality.
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we expect pre-dispositional factors to combine and in-
fluence connectedness in a stronger way than they do 
individually, suggesting:
H3. The interaction of  high levels of  relational 
proclivity with high levels of  strategic intent will 
result in a greater level of  connectedness in IFRs 
than either relational proclivity or strategic intent 
individually.
2.2.3. Interfirm relationship effectiveness
Relationship effectiveness can be viewed in terms 
of  objective financial or economic data such as contri-
butions or increases in revenues. However, researchers 
have examined IFR effectiveness in terms of  factors in-
volving psychosocial states and behaviors in the rela-
tionship that are expected to generate benefits, and ul-
timately financial rewards (e.g., Anderson and Weitz, 
1992 and Morgan and Hunt, 1994). These rewards may 
involve transaction cost efficiencies. Several investiga-
tions are premised, to some extent, on the notion that 
close partner-style relationships are more desirable and 
efficient because they involve lower governance costs. 
Thus, the firm enjoys a bottom line outcome of  reduced 
transaction costs. Importantly, some studies also have 
demonstrated that these effectiveness variables relate to 
economic performance variables such as growth (e.g., 
Ambler et al., 1999).
We drew on the models of  organizational effective-
ness introduced to the IFR literature by Kumar et al. 
(1992) to isolate several dimensions of  relationship 
effectiveness. To investigate IFR effectiveness, we in-
cluded reciprocity, information exchange quality, and 
cooperation between the partners. We selected these 
factors, because taken together, they relate to func-
tional imperatives of  goal attainment, pattern mainte-
nance, integration, and adaptation cited by Kumar et 
al. (1992). While these three factors can in no way be 
considered an exhaustive treatment of  IFR effective-
ness, they do provide a reasonably broad-based per-
spective. Further, they directly involve relationship pro-
cesses and activities as opposed to socio-psychological 
states or conditions that, although important, have in-
fluences more removed and sometimes more difficult 
to observe.
In general, we expect the level of  connectedness a 
firm exhibits in its boundary spanning activities to in-
fluence individual IFR effectiveness in a positive fash-
ion. While a greater level of  connectedness (i.e., more 
interaction across multiple points of  managerial hierar-
chy in the firm) does not automatically result in any cer-
tain type of  behavior in the IFR, it does set the stage and 
provide the opportunity for developing IFRs into what-
ever form will best serve the partner firms’ interests. Be-
low, we develop each of  these relationships in detail.
2.2.4. Reciprocity
Goldner (1960) noted that reciprocity is a key pos-
tulate in social life. It is a critical intervening variable 
through which patterns of  social behavior are estab-
lished thereby yielding stability in social systems (Gold-
ner, 1960, p. 161). Reciprocity suggests that the contin-
gency of  partner response sets behavioral patterns in 
motion within the relationship. A’s positive behavior to-
ward B is driven by and in response to B’s positive be-
havior toward A. The order and stability of  the relation-
ship is founded on the mutually contingent exchange of  
benefits between relationship participants. Reciprocity 
ensures long run gratification for partners.
While, to our knowledge, reciprocity has not been 
treated explicitly in the IFR literature, it has been pro-
posed as potentially important by a number of  theo-
rists as it can provide insights into many socio-psycho-
logical components in the IFR Ford and McDowell, 
1999 and Heide and Miner, 1992. We have some empir-
ical evidence that reciprocity comes into play with cer-
tain specific dimensions of  IFRs Anderson and Weitz, 
1992, Johnson et al., 1993 and Kumar et al., 1998. The-
ory, coupled with this empirical evidence suggests that 
positive behaviors by a firm in an IFR will generate pos-
itive behaviors in return by the IFR partner.
We expect that the extent of  connectedness exhibited 
in boundary spanning will influence the development 
of  reciprocity in the IFR for several reasons. The fre-
quent, high quality interactions involving multiple lev-
els of  management that characterizes strong connect-
edness in boundary spanning increases the likelihood 
that reciprocity will develop first and foremost because 
it provides opportunity for reciprocal behaviors to oc-
cur. Thick boundary spanning does not necessarily en-
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sure that reciprocity will develop in a positive direction, 
or that it will even happen at all. However, it furnishes 
an incubator in which reciprocity can grow; it provides 
the opportunity for mutual learning, testing, and adjust-
ment by partners in the IFR (Heide and Miner, 1992). 
Essentially, it provides favorable attendant conditions for 
reciprocity to evolve in the IFR.
Other more subtle considerations also contribute to 
the potential effects of  connectedness on reciprocity in 
IFRs. These effects relate to the value of  actions in a re-
lationship and the value of  relationships (Ford and Mc-
Dowell, 1999). The commitment of  time, effort, and re-
sources involved in the type of  boundary spanning that 
comprises connectedness has value as a signal that the 
IFR itself  is highly valued. We expect that such a high 
powered signal of  value should set in motion a positive 
reciprocal pattern in the IFR.
When there is a high level of  connectedness in bound-
ary spanning, expansion of  interdependence between 
partners in a relationship becomes more likely. As IFR 
partner interdependence grows, positive elements such 
as trust, commitment, and satisfaction also tend to de-
velop in the relationship (e.g., Geyskens et al., 1996, 
Geyskens et al., 1999 and Kumar et al., 1995). These 
positive psychosocial elements are likely to generate or 
at least coexist with positive behaviors and behavioral 
norms such as reciprocity. Thus, we posit the following:
H4. The more that connectedness characterizes a 
firm’s boundary spanning activities, the more the 
IFR will exhibit reciprocity.
2.2.5. Information exchange
Information exchange plays a critical role in IFR ef-
fectiveness for a number of  reasons. Among the most im-
portant of  these are uncertainty absorption and learning. 
A vast literature has established the central role of  in-
formation in uncertainty and its reduction (e.g., Achrol 
and Stern, 1988). The more and better sources of  infor-
mation available to the firm, the less uncertainty it faces. 
Thus, if  high quality information exchange characterizes 
an IFR, it can absorb uncertainty for the firm. Informa-
tion processing theory provides yet another perspective. 
When boundary spanning structures are thick, interac-
tion and communication is frequent and multiple levels 
of  management are involved in the interaction between 
the partner firms. This type of  interaction can be consid-
ered as comprising rich information processing mecha-
nisms Daft and Lengel, 1986 and Thomas and Trevino, 
1993. These mechanisms between firms are seen as di-
rectly reducing problems such as equivocality in infor-
mation (Thomas and Trevino, 1993). Such equivocal-
ity reduction suggests that information flows will be of  
high quality.
An additional consideration is communication con-
tent. Although frequent communication alone does not 
suggest that the communication content is substantive 
(i.e., that it involves meaningful information), strong 
healthy communication patterns certainly increase the 
probability that meaningful information will be ex-
changed in the relationship Larson, 1991 and Mohr 
and Sohi, 1995. Indeed, such communication patterns 
between firms have been conceptualized as including 
productive content (cf., Mohr et al., 1996). When these 
communication patterns expand to include multiple lev-
els of  managerial hierarchy as suggested in high levels of  
connectedness, the likelihood of  substantive information 
passing between the IFR partners increases even more. 
For these reasons, we posit the following:
H5. The more that connectedness characterizes 
a firm’s boundary spanning activities, the higher 
the quality of  information exchange in the IFR.
2.2.6. Cooperation
Cooperation between IFR partner firms can en-
hance productivity and significantly increase joint and 
individual outcomes for the firms Anderson and Na-
rus, 1990 and Dwyer et al., 1987. As with reciprocity 
and effective information exchange, boundary span-
ning that involves frequent interaction and crosses mul-
tiple managerial levels does not necessarily guarantee 
greater levels of  cooperation. However, for several rea-
sons, a high level of  connectedness provides the oppor-
tunity and foundation for cooperative behavior. When 
a high level of  connectedness characterizes the interface 
between IFR partners, they have the opportunity and 
ability to establish mutually congruent goals, which is 
an essential and cementing element of  cooperation (Jap, 
1999). In addition, thick boundary spanning provides a 
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process framework in which the IFR partners can fig-
ure and plan complementary actions. Because connect-
edness involves high quality communication, partners 
have the opportunity to tailor their coordination efforts 
to their individual needs and conditions. Connectedness 
allows for partner firms to effectively combine resources 
and capabilities.
Another important issue is that because of  the in-
vestment of  effort and resources involved in connect-
edness, greater levels of  it signal that the relationship is 
valued and that the firm is committed to the IFR. Such 
signaling suggests that the relationship will endure and 
extend over time and should encourage cooperation 
(Heide and Miner, 1992). For these reasons, we expect 
high levels of  connectedness to provide positive atten-
dant conditions for cooperation.
H6. The more that connectedness characterizes a 
firm’s boundary spanning activities, the more co-
operation in the IFR.
3. Methods
3.1. Sample and data collection procedures
Data were collected in a mail survey of  U.S. firms 
in several industries. Specifically, firms in SIC codes 28 
(chemical and allied products), 30 (rubber and plastic 
products), 33 and 34 (metal fabrications and products), 
35 (industrial machinery and equipment), 36 (electronic 
and electric equipment) and 37 (automotive and trans-
portation equipment) comprised the sample. These in-
dustries were chosen because preliminary interviews 
suggested that the research topic was relevant and com-
pelling for the incumbent firms. Further, interviews sug-
gested that the construct variance would likely be suffi-
cient for testing the posited relationships.
We procured a list of  925 firms from Dun and Brad-
street. The first step in data collection involved a rigor-
ous prescreening by mail. The major focus of  the pre-
screening was to isolate the appropriate key informant 
for our study. The prescreening included a battery of  
questions regarding the potential respondent’s position, 
length of  time in position, duties as a boundary span-
ner, amount of  time spent interfacing with other firms, 
and ability to report on the information required in our 
study (Campbell, 1955). This ensured us that the respon-
dent was qualified to report on the firm’s general be-
havioral tendencies and “attitudes” towards partnering 
and IFRs in general, as well as on specific relationships. 
The managers we isolated as appropriate key informants 
varied from firm to firm in their position and function. 
The vast majority held the title of  vice president or di-
rector of  operations, procurement, manufacturing, ma-
terials management, or supply processing, for example. 
To further ensure the validity of  our data and ensure 
that we had isolated the correct key informant, we in-
cluded validation items in the research instrument. We 
used these items to verify again that the executives who 
responded were fully qualified to provide the informa-
tion we requested.
Of  the 925 prescreening forms mailed, 781 were de-
livered and 329 returned. Based on the prescreening 
information, evaluation of  the respondent as a quali-
fied key informant resulted in the elimination of  10 re-
sponses. For the qualified informants, we mailed out the 
main data collection package that included a personal-
ized cover letter, the questionnaire, and a self-addressed 
envelope for returning the completed questionnaire. The 
mailing of  319 and one follow-up generated 176 com-
pleted questionnaires. The response rate of  23% based 
on the original list and 55% of  the prescreened poten-
tial respondents falls within rates accepted in the liter-
ature (Mishra et al., 1998). We evaluated nonresponse 
bias by comparing the respondents with the non-respon-
dents on company sales volume, number of  employees 
and industry classification (SIC) code. We also com-
pared the early and late respondents on the model vari-
ables and classification data (Armstrong and Overton, 
1977). The t-tests showed no significant differences, sug-
gesting that response bias was not a significant problem 
in this study.
3.2. Questionnaire development and pretesting
Measures developed for this study were based on our 
conceptualizations, the academic literature, practitioner 
literature, and field interviews. Operational definitions 
derived from these sources provided the foundation for 
construct item pools. Preliminary item pools were re-
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fined through numerous iterations of  review by experts 
in the research area. After the peer review culminated 
in some satisfactory conclusion, we put the items into 
the research instrument form for another round of  peer 
review with questionnaire format as the major focus.
We pretested the questionnaire through in-depth in-
terviews with executives from a small number of  firms. 
We interviewed respondents and discussed the goals and 
objectives of  the study in general terms, after which they 
completed the questionnaire. We extensively debriefed 
the pretest subjects. This pretesting approach seemed ap-
propriate for several reasons. First, past research experi-
ence suggested that the prescreening procedure we used 
would provide us with sufficient information about re-
sponse rate and generate sufficient sample size for our 
study. Thus, pretesting to learn more about response rate 
was unnecessary. Second, given that a number of  con-
structs in our study are new, we believed we could iso-
late problems in our measures and questionnaire format 
more effectively with an in-depth interviewing approach. 
The pretesting generated little change in the question-
naire. All respondents completed it in the expected 
amount of  time, understood the tasks, the instructions, 
the items, and the language used. In addition, all felt 
that we were addressing relevant issues and that our op-
erationalizations succeeded in tapping the constructs.
Because some of  our measures focused on firm level 
behaviors and characteristics, while others focused on 
behaviors and characteristics specific to certain indi-
vidual IFRs, we were concerned that the respondents 
changed focus appropriately when completing the ques-
tionnaire. To address this concern, we arranged items 
so that the firm level and IFR level reporting tasks were 
physically separated in the instrument. In addition, 
items intended to “force” the transition from firm level 
to IFR specific responses separated the sections. Impor-
tantly, the pretest ascertained that transitioning between 
the reporting tasks was not a problem.
3.3. Measures
We used multiple-item Likert scales to operational-
ize our constructs. Appendix A provides details of  the 
measures and scales used in the study. We assessed stra-
tegic intent with an eight-item scale that queried manag-
ers about their perceptions of  the extent of  the firm’s 
strategic aggressiveness and focus in terms of  win-
ning, growth, leadership, and competitive dominance 
(Hamel and Prahalad, 1989). We operationalized rela-
tional proclivity, the general tendency to engage in close 
partner-style IFRs, with a nine-item scale. Three items 
were dropped during the measure purification process. 
The measure for connectedness consisted of  eight items 
that captured the ease, amount, and extent of  cross-
managerial level interaction between firms Jaworksi 
and Kohli, 1993, Maltz and Kohli, 1996 and Song and 
Parry, 1993. The cooperation measure consisted of  four 
items gleaned from the literature (e.g., Anderson and 
Narus, 1990 and Morgan and Hunt, 1994). To assess 
the quality of  information exchange we developed a nine-
item measure based on the dimensions posited by Me-
non and Varadarajan (1992). A six-item scale based on 
the work of  Goldner (1960) was used to operational-
ize reciprocity.
3.4. Control variables
Several studies have found that relationship age can be 
a potential source of  variance that confounds research 
findings (e.g., Mohr et al., 1996). Thus, we included it 
as a control variable. In addition, research shows that 
the environment can influence IFRs (e.g., Noordewier 
et al., 1990). Although, we realize these effects can be 
important, the focus of  our research question was to 
ascertain and depict the effects of  firm dispositions on 
the IFR apart from environmental turbulence. Therefore, 
we also included environmental turbulence as a covari-
ate, measuring it on a one (not turbulent) to seven (very 
turbulent) scale. 2 Size is another factor that can mask 
and confound research findings. However, in our treat-
ment, we attempted to capture the effects of  the “ele-
phant and ant” syndrome (Cullen, 1999), focusing on 
asymmetries in size and the direction of  the asymme-
try. We included a size asymmetry variable that assessed 
whether the supplier was larger, the buyer was larger, 
or whether they were balanced. Then we included a 
2. Extensive secondary data were gathered for each industry included in the study. The data were evaluated by a panel of  
MBA students and on that basis, the industries were rated for environmental turbulence. The rating process iterated until 
consensus was reached and the entire panel agreed on the rating.
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variable that measured the magnitude of  the size imbal-
ance, regardless of  direction.
3.5. Measure validation
Our preliminary exploratory analyses revealed that 
some items for relational proclivity, connectedness, 
and cooperation measures were not consistent with the 
scales. After deletion of  these items, we conducted a 
confirmatory factor analysis (CFA) to assess construct 
reliability and uni-dimensionality. Results indicated 
a statically significant χ2 (705.43, df=367). However, 
the Comparative Fit Index (CFI)=0.95 and the Aver-
age Off-Diagonal Standardized Residual (AOSR)=0.07 
indicated an acceptable level of  the fit for the model. 
Standardized item loadings for all constructs were sta-
tistically significant (minimum t-value=4.43). The stan-
dardized loadings ranged between 0.40 and 0.93 and had 
a mean value of  0.75. The maximum inter-factor corre-
lation (Φ) was 0.70 (between cooperation and reciproc-
ity). The construct reliabilities ranged between 0.79 and 
0.95 and the average variance extracted (AVE) for the 
measures ranged from 0.50 to 0.74 (see Appendix A), 
meeting standards accepted in the literature Bagozzi and 
Yi, 1988 and Nunnally and Bernstein, 1994.
Discriminant validity was evaluated through confir-
matory factor analyses of  construct pairs. For all pairs 
of  multiple-item reflective measures, we compared an 
unconstrained CFA model with one where the factor 
correlation was fixed to unity (Bagozzi et al., 1991). In 
all cases, the unconstrained model provided a signifi-
cantly superior fit, suggesting adequate discriminant 
validity between the measures Anderson and Gerb-
ing, 1982 and Steenkamp and van Trijp, 1991. Fur-
ther, all the AVEs were greater than the Φs (Fornell 
and Larcker, 1981).
Our understanding and conceptualization of  the in-
formation flows effectiveness construct dictated that we 
use a formative measure to assess it. Thus, the precision 
and thoroughness with which the construct domain is 
established and tapped (content validity) provide the ma-
jor validation tool Bollen and Lennox, 1991 and How-
ell, 1987. Our detailed efforts in the preliminary stages 
of  the research, interviews and pretesting, along with a 
visual inspection of  the items included in the measure 
(Appendix A), provide evidence of  content validity. Ev-
idence provided in the above analyses suggests that the 
measures included in this study possess sufficient reli-
ability and validity to proceed with hypotheses testing. 
For hypotheses testing analysis, we developed summated 
composites. Table 1 shows the zero order correlations 
along with means and standard deviations.
4. Analysis and results
We tested our hypotheses using OLS regression with 
a product term included to test the conditional hypoth-
esis. To check for multicollinearity, we examined the 
bivariate correlations, variance inflation factors (VIF), 
and the condition numbers suggested by Mason and 
Perreault (1991). Typically, correlations higher than 
0.80, VIFs over 10, and condition numbers over 30 in-
dicate severe multicollinearity problems Belsley et al., 
1980 and Mason and Perreault, 1991. For our regression 
equations, the highest VIF value was 1.25, and the high-
est condition number was 16.22. All bivariate correla-
tions were less that 0.80. Together these numbers suggest 
that multicollinearity was not a problem. Hypotheses 
testing involved estimation of  the following equations:
CONNECT =
a0 + b1 ENVIR + b2 RELEN  
+ b3 SIZEMAG + b4 SIZEDIR  
+ b5 STRATINTENT  + b6 RELPROC 
+ b7 STRATINTENT × RELPROC + e   (1)
RECIP = 
a0 + b1 ENVIR + b2 RELEN + b3 SIZEMAG 
+ b4 SIZEDIR + b5 CONNECT + e    (2)
INFOFLOW = 
a0 + b1 ENVIR + b2 RELEN + b3 SIZEMAG 
+ b4 SIZEDIR + b5 CONNECT + e  (3)
COOP = 
a0 + b1 ENVIR + b2 RELEN + b3 SIZEMAG 
+ b4 SIZEDIR + b5 CONNECT + e    (4)
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where CONNECT = connectedness, ENVIR = envi-
ronmental turbulence, RELEN = relationship length, 
SIZEMAG = the magnitude of  the size difference be-
tween buyer and seller, SIZEDIR = whether it is the 
buyer or the seller that is larger, STRATINTENT = 
strategic intent, RELPROC = relational proclivity, RE-
CIP = reciprocity, INFOFLOW = information flow, 
and COOP = cooperation.
Table 2. OLS regression estimates for hypotheses testing
Endogenous Exogenous Hypothesis Standardized t-Value Model R2  
variables  variables   parameter 
    estimates
Connectedness Control variables    
    Environmental turbulence  –0.10 –1.43 
   Relationship length  –0.01 –0.07 
   Size asymmetry magnitude  0.00 0.03 
   Size asymmetry direction  0.04 0.60  
 Predictor variables     
   Strategic intent H1 0.35 4.61***  
   Relational proclivity H2 0.27 3.64***   
 Interactions      
   Strategic intent×Relational H3 0.08 1.20 0.30
  proclivity     F(7,159 df)=9.74 
 
Reciprocity Control variables     
   Environmental turbulence  –0.04 –0.53  
   Relationship length  0.08 1.09  
   Size asymmetry magnitude  –0.03 –0.39  
   Size asymmetry direction  0.12 1.62  
 Predictor variable     
   Connectedness H4 0.35 4.71*** 0.15
      F(5,161 df)=5.71
 
Information flow Control variables     
   Environmental turbulence  0.10 1.35  
   Relationship length  0.10 1.27  
   Size asymmetry magnitude  –0.02 –0.28  
   Size asymmetry direction  0.00 0.02  
 Predictor variable     
   Connectedness H5 0.35 4.69*** 0.13
      F(5,161 df)=4.89
 
Cooperation Control variables     
   Environmental turbulence  –0.02 –0.32  
   Relationship length  0.11 1.43  
   Size asymmetry magnitude  –0.10 –1.33  
   Size asymmetry direction  0.18 2.41**  
 Predictor variable     
   Connectedness H6 0.32 4.31*** 0.16
      F(5,161 df)=6.05
*** p < 0.001 (one-tailed tests).
** p < 0.01 (one-tailed tests).
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4.1. Hypothesis testing
Table 2 shows the results of  the OLS path analysis. 
Hypothesis 1 states that strong strategic intent on the 
part of  the firm results in more connectedness in the 
firm’s boundary spanning. With a statistically signifi-
cant standardized parameter estimate of  0.35 (t = 4.61, 
p < 0.001), the results support H1. In the second hypoth-
eses, we posited that greater relational proclivity on the 
part of  a firm would result in greater connectedness in 
its interactions in IFRs. The results indicate support for 
that hypothesis. The standardized parameter estimate 
of  0.27 was statistically significant (t = 3.64, p < 0.001). 
For Hypothesis 3, we posited that strong relational pro-
clivity would couple with strong strategic intent to re-
sult in even greater connectedness between IFR partner 
firms than with the two predispositions individually. The 
standardized parameter estimate of  the product term 
was 0.08 and was not statistically significant (t = 1.20, p 
> 0.05), indicating no support for H3.
H4, H5 and H6 addressed the effects of  connect-
edness on IFR effectiveness. We expected that greater 
connectedness, i.e., thicker interfirm boundary span-
ning structures, would result in more reciprocity in 
the IFR (H4), more effective information flows (H5), 
and greater interfirm cooperation (H6). As the lower 
sections in Table 2 show, H4, H5 and H6 were sup-
ported. Connectedness had a significant positive as-
sociation with reciprocity (standardized parameter 
estimate=0.35, t = 4.71, p < 0.001), effectiveness of  in-
formation flow (standardized parameter estimate=0.35, 
t = 4.69, p < 0.001) and cooperation (standardized pa-
rameter estimate=0.32, t = 4.31, p < 0.001).
4.2. Tests for the mediating effects of  connectedness
We employed the product of  coefficients method 
Baron and Kenny, 1986 and Sobel, 1982 to determine 
the mediating effects of  connectedness. Using the stan-
dardized regression coefficients from Table 2, we com-
puted the magnitude of  the indirect effects of  the exog-
enous variables (relational proclivity, strategic intent) on 
the endogenous variables (reciprocity, information flow, 
cooperation) through the mediating variable (connected-
ness). We used the regression coefficients in Table 2 be-
cause they take into account the effects of  the covariates 
and interaction term, and therefore, provide truer esti-
mates for the mediating effect. As may be seen in Table 
3, all the indirect path effects are highly significant indi-
cating that connectedness mediates the relationship be-
tween the endogenous and exogenous variables.
5. Discussion and implications
The central proposition guiding this research was that 
firms possess traits or characteristics, referred to in this 
paper as predispositions, which result in relatively stable 
tendencies to behave in a certain way across a variety of  
conditions. We argue that predispositions influence the 
activities and behaviors of  the firm in the making and 
management of  its IFRs. We explored our central prop-
Table 3. Tests for mediating effects based on product of  coefficients method
Exogenous variable X Mediator Endogenous Path coefficienta Path coefficient a*b Significance
b of   
 variable M  variable Y  X→M, a  M→Y, b   a*b (z value)
Relational proclivity Connectedness Reciprocity  0.27 0.35 0.095 2.34
  Information flow 0.27 0.35 0.095 2.17
  Cooperation 0.27 0.32 0.086 2.61
Strategic intent Connectedness Reciprocity  0.35 0.35 0.123 3.50
  Information flow 0.35 0.35 0.123 3.03
  Cooperation 0.35 0.32 0.112 4.51
a. Path coefficients are the standardized regression estimates from Table 2.
b. The significance test is based on the formula provided by Baron and Kenny (1986).
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osition by investigating the role of  two predispositions, 
strategic intent or aggressiveness and relational procliv-
ity, which theory and literature suggested would be rel-
evant in the context of  IFR management. We tested the 
effects of  the predispositions on the extent of  connect-
edness i.e., the thickness of  boundary spanning, gener-
ally exhibited in the firm’s interface with other firms. 
Further, implying a mediating role for connectedness, 
we tested the effects of  predispositions on specific out-
comes in an individual IFR. Through connectedness, we 
expected that the predispositions would influence indi-
rectly the firm’s behavior in and management of  specific 
individual IFRs.
Generally, our expectations regarding the role of  pre-
dispositions were supported. Our data show that when 
firms are strategically aggressive, they tended to engage 
more intensely with partners, building a thicker connec-
tion at the interface in terms of  multiple managers at 
multiple levels in the firm interacting through multiple 
means in substantive high quality ways. These strate-
gically aggressive firms may see strong connections in 
IFRs as a means for tapping into the expanded resource 
base offered by IFR partner firms. Or they may be at-
tempting to build inimitability into what they see as a 
valuable strategic asset. In addition, our data show that 
firms vary in their proclivity for close partner-style rela-
tionships. The tendency to trust IFR partners, the pref-
erence for and comfort with close IFRs resulted in inter-
actions characterized by greater levels of  connectedness.
Additionally, we expected that the predispositions 
would combine and result in stronger effects on con-
nectedness. For the predispositions of  strategic intent 
and relational proclivity, our data suggest that this is 
not the case. Combining strategic intent with relational 
proclivity resulted in no greater levels of  connectedness 
than the presence of  them individually. We conjecture, 
however, that this result does not necessarily suggest 
that other firm predispositions and perhaps other con-
texts would not generate some combined effects. Our ev-
idence regarding a general proposition of  combined pre-
dispositional effects is inconclusive. This is one of  the 
questions that should be explored further in future stud-
ies in addition to those discussed below.
In our study, we expected that the indirect effects of  
predispositions on outcomes would be important, rip-
pling through the IFR in terms of  behaviors and activi-
ties that reflect individual relationship effectiveness. Spe-
cifically, we were concerned with the influence of  firm 
level predispositions through connectedness on cooper-
ation, reciprocity, and information exchange in individ-
ual IFRs. As expected, our data indicated that greater 
connectedness between the partner firms, enhanced in-
dividual IFR outcomes in terms of  productive activities 
and behavioral patterns.
While our investigations confirmed that connected-
ness played a significant mediating role in the influence 
of  predispositions on outcomes, our results also indi-
cated that there are direct effects. These effects, illus-
trated by the dotted lines in Fig. 1, suggest that above 
and beyond their influence through connectedness, 
higher levels of  these predispositions resulted in more 
productive IFRs as we conceptualized it. This implies 
that beyond the signaling and communications-related 
factors we addressed in the concept of  connectedness, 
when firms are predisposed in certain ways (i.e., have 
a relational proclivity and are strategically ambitious), 
they act directly on those predispositions in their behav-
iors in IFRs. These firms apparently create and activate 
patterns of  reciprocity, information flows, and coopera-
tion directly in their IFR activities.
In addition to introducing the notion of  predisposi-
tional influences on IFRs, this study offers a conceptu-
alization and measure of  the firm’s strategic ambition or 
aggressiveness in terms of  the firm’s strategic intent. In 
a tangential way, this issue has been treated in the liter-
ature through the Miles and Snow (1978) typology (e.g., 
McKee et al., 1989). However, the multiple dimensions 
that underpin the Miles and Snow typology introduce 
ambiguity and confusion in measurement and in sorting 
out research results. For example, it is difficult to attri-
bute findings to innovativeness, versus flexibility, versus 
growth or market dominance. As conceptualized here, 
strategic intent involves a more precisely delimited con-
struct domain that may facilitate interpretation of  re-
sults in future studies.
As with all research, this study also has limitations. 
First and foremost, we did not intend this study to in-
clude an exhaustive treatment of  predispositions. We 
searched the literature and sifted out several that seemed 
compelling as a starting point for exploring the general 
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notion of  predispositional influences on IFRs. There are 
a number of  others that may come into play. For exam-
ple, Dutta and Weiss (1997) find that technological inno-
vativeness relates to the use of  more of  certain types of  
interfirm arrangements. Though Dutta and Weiss (1997) 
did not address it, innovativeness may play a role in the 
way firms behave in and manage individual IFRs. As 
another example, firms likely vary on their preferences, 
i.e., predispositions for risk (e.g., Sitkin and Weingert, 
1995). Risk preferences may influence whether or not 
firms engage in close partner-style relationships at all. 
Risk preferences could greatly influence how many and 
which IFRs the firm selects to cultivate into partner-
ships. In addition, firm level risk preferences may work 
in combination with other predispositions such as those 
studied here.
In this study, we conceptualized relational procliv-
ity as a predisposition toward close partner-style IFRs. 
In contrast, firms could have a tendency and prefer-
ence for arm’s-length or transaction based interfirm ex-
change. Despite its attractions in certain contexts, re-
lational exchange in between firms is not always the 
preferred way to do business. Future research should 
include investigations of  predispositions toward transac-
tion-based exchange to augment what has been learned 
in this study. We have investigated several predisposi-
tions that the literature suggested would be important, 
and we have noted several others that also may be im-
portant, no doubt still others will emerge. Researchers 
should explore the individual and combined effects of  
these predispositions and continue to isolate and explore 
new ones.
Beyond this, other limitations exist. For example, our 
study does not consider information on growth or fi-
nancial performance for both the IFR and the firm. In-
cluding such “hard” performance data would provide a 
stronger picture of  predispositional influences. Future 
research should attempt to treat financial performance 
and growth. Also in this research, we attempted to em-
phasize dependent constructs related to actions, behav-
iors, or activities in the IFR. We did not include con-
structs that would be considered more as affective states 
or conditions in the relationship, such as trust or com-
mitment. Given that the literature has shown such fac-
tors to be important in IFRs, interesting future research 
questions might involve explorations of  how predispo-
sitions influence the development of  trust and commit-
ment, for example.
Other limitations involve our treatment of  the predis-
positions. This investigation involves information from 
one side of  the dyad in the buyer–seller IFR. While pre-
dispositions necessarily involve one firm, a richer pic-
ture of  their effects might be developed with multiple 
perspectives on dependent constructs such as connect-
edness. Likewise, tracking the effects of  firm predispo-
sitions on the evolution of  an IFR over time may pro-
vide a deeper and richer understanding. In addition, our 
study involves the relationship with the supplier from the 
customer perspective. Influences of  firm level predispo-
sitions on IFRs may play out differently depending on 
whether the IFR is upstream or downstream. For exam-
ple, relational proclivity may behave differently and in-
fluence supplier relationships differently than customer 
relationships.
Finally, though not necessarily a limitation, another 
question derives from this work. Theory suggests that 
while predispositions influence IFRs, external constitu-
encies such as IFR partners in turn also influence firm 
predispositions. Investigations of  IFR influences on firm 
predispositions, though intriguing and potentially very 
useful, may be a difficult research proposition. A rela-
tively long-term longitudinal investigation would be re-
quired and perhaps ethnographic or case studies may be 
necessary because theory suggests that changes in firm 
predispositions would likely be quite slow.
For managers, this research has several important im-
plications involving the compatibility of  predispositions 
between IFR partner firms. First, for managers, the ex-
istence and effects of  predispositions reifies the impor-
tance of  appropriate identification and selection of  IFR 
partners (Dwyer et al., 1987). Our study provides fairly 
compelling evidence that some significant attention to 
partner predispositions in initiating IFRs is warranted. 
The productivity and effectiveness of  the IFR can be 
enhanced and problems can be avoided or better man-
aged in the IFR as it evolves if  the potential partner’s 
predispositions are considered in conjunction with the 
firm’s own.
Second, in situations where IFR partner choice is 
limited and existing IFRs are necessary but problem-
atic, managers may be able to work to mold or reform 
partner predispositions so that they are more compat-
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ible and positive influences in the relationship. As we 
noted, change in predispositions is likely a gradual and 
long-term proposition, thus requiring a significant com-
mitment by the firm. Yet, if  the potential benefit of  the 
IFR were great enough and the relationship itself  long-
term enough that attempting to remold partner predis-
positions would be viable, the eventual rewards of  such 
an endeavor could be substantial.
Third, as an alternative to changing partner predispo-
sitions, simply understanding them may be just as im-
portant. In instances when a suboptimal IFR is a mat-
ter of  necessity, understanding predispositions can help 
anticipate difficulties and diffuse problems. For exam-
ple, attention to predispositional influences on the IFR 
may help determine the tolerance for dependence and 
control, and the appropriateness of  governance alterna-
tives. Understanding predispositions may help ascertain 
the extent to which relationships could or should be cul-
tivated into close partner-style relationships. It may help 
managers decide on the extent to which resources should 
be committed to a given IFR. In addition, understanding 
predispositions can facilitate effective conflict manage-
ment, and promote productive relationship dynamics.
Firm predispositions affect firm behavior in many are-
nas other than IFR making and management. Research-
ers have just begun to explore these possibilities (e.g., 
Gatignon and Xuereb, 1997). Many questions still re-
main. For example, how do predispositions influence 
things such as the firm’s competitive responses, market 
development strategies, use and allocation of  marketing 
resources or promotional strategies? In general, the no-
tion of  predispositional influences offers an intriguing 
and potentially productive research avenue.
Appendix A. Measures
A.1. Relational proclivity
In general, in my firm the view is that…
1. closer partner-type relationships with suppliers 
offer a major advantage in doing business.
2. teaming up and working closely with suppliers 
allows us to be more effective.
3. it is appropriate to share proprietary informa-
tion with our suppliers if  it is useful to do so.
4. most often, suppliers can be trusted to meet 
their obligations.
5. most of  the time, suppliers will not take advan-
tage of  us.
6. *forming close partner-style relationships with 
suppliers is inadvisable (reverse).
7. *we have to be cautious in dealing with any sup-
plier (reverse).
8. the less any supplier knows about how we do 
things, the better off  we are (reverse).
9. *we should not involve any supplier too closely 
in our projects (reverse).
Scale anchors: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree; Construct reliability 0.85; Average Variance 
Extracted (AVE) 0.50.
A.2. Strategic intent
To what extent do you consider that your firm…
1. is strategically aggressive?
2. seeks competitive dominance?
3. systematically builds competitive advantage?
4. seeks market leadership?
5. focuses on strategic targets and goals?
6. reconfigures resources into new competitive 
advantage?
7. focuses attention of  winning in the market 
place?
8. sets targets for everyone’s commitment and 
effort?
Scale anchors: 1 = not at all; 7 = very large extent; 
Construct reliability 0.93; AVE 0.63.
A.3. Connectedness
1. It is easy for our suppliers to meet with people 
in our firm regardless of  rank or position.
2. When the need arises, a supplier can talk to any-
body in our firm without formal channels.
3. There is an opportunity for informal communi-
cation between our supplier’s people and peo-
ple from our firm.
4. People in our firm are accessible to our supplier.
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5. *Our suppliers often contact upper level manag-
ers in our firm.
6. We have systems and procedures to promote in-
teraction with suppliers.
7. Through training program and other get-togeth-
ers, we provide opportunities for suppliers to 
understand our firm.
8. *We keep our suppliers informed about what is 
going on in our firm.
Scale anchors: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree; Construct reliability 0.78; AVE 0.50.
A.4. Reciprocity
1. We are always willing to do this supplier a favor 
because we know it will be returned.
2. This supplier is always willing to do us a favor 
because they know that it will be returned.
3. This supplier always helps and supports us and 
we do likewise.
4. In this relationship, both partners feel that one 
good turn deserves another.
5. This supplier makes sure that they do their part 
because they realize we will do ours.
6. We feel obliged to do our part extremely well in 
this relationship because this supplier has done 
their part so well.
Scale anchors: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree; Construct reliability 0.94; AVE 0.74.
A.5. Information flows
The extent to which information flow in the IFR is 
sufficient/insufficient in the following terms:
1. accuracy.
2. amount.
3. reliability.
4. usefulness.
5. consistency.
6. timeliness.
7. importance.
8. relevance.
9. value.
Scale anchors: 1 = completely insufficient; 7 = ex-
ceeds our needs.
A.6. Cooperation
1. We try to cooperate with this supplier in what-
ever ways we can.
2. When any problem arises with this supplier, we 
try to work it out together.
3. We often plan joint programs, projects, or activi-
ties together with this supplier.
4. *We never collaborate with this supplier on any 
joint activities (reverse).
Scale anchors: 1 = strongly disagree; 7 = strongly 
agree; Construct reliability 0.79; AVE 0.58.
A.7. Control variables
• Relationship length: Number of  years doing busi-
ness with this supplier.
• Size asymmetry direction: Whether respondents’ 
firm is larger, supplier firm is larger, or both 
are similar.
• Size asymmetry magnitude: Respondents indi-
cated how many times larger own/supplier 
firm was.
• Environmental turbulence: Based on secondary 
industry data, responding firms were rated by 
independent judges on a one (not turbulent) to 
seven (very turbulent) scale.
Asterisk (*) indicates that the item was deleted in 
scale purification.
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